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Philosophical Implications of Inflationary Cosmology
Joshua Knobe, Ken D. Olum, and Alexander Vilenkin
Abstract
Recent developments in cosmology indicate that every history hav-
ing a nonzero probability is realized in infinitely many distinct regions
of spacetime. Thus, it appears that the universe contains infinitely
many civilizations exactly like our own, as well as infinitely many civ-
ilizations that differ from our own in any way permitted by physical
laws. We explore the implications of this conclusion for ethical the-
ory and for the doomsday argument. In the infinite universe, we find
that the doomsday argument applies only to effects which change the
average lifetime of all civilizations, and not those which affect our
civilization alone.
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1 Introduction
It is said that the ancient Greek philosopher Diodorus Cronos once put forth
a powerful argument for a peculiar view about the relationship between the
possible and the actual. Diodorus claimed that everything that could possibly
happen is either occurring right now or will occur at some point in the future.
His claim, in other words, was that there are no unrealized possibilities.
Unfortunately, the works of Diodorus have been lost, and although a number
of modern philosophers have tried valiantly to reconstruct his argument, no
one really knows exactly how it was supposed to go.
Nonetheless, we think that Diodorus’s conclusion was essentially correct,
and we will here provide a new, entirely modern argument for it. Unlike the
original argument of Diodorus, however, our argument draws on inflationary
cosmology and quantum mechanics. It follows from inflationary cosmology
that the universe is infinite and can therefore be divided into an infinite
number of regions of any given size. But it follows from quantum theory
that the total number of histories that can occur in any one of these regions
in a finite time is finite. We draw on these two premises to argue for our
central conclusion: that all possible histories are realized in some region of
the universe.
This conclusion must be understood in a special sense. First, note that we
are reserving the word ‘possible’ for physical possibilities. Thus, although it
might be metaphysically possible for a system to violate strict physical laws,
such a system would not count as ‘possible’ in our sense. Second, we do not
mean to say that anything that can possibly happen to a token individual will
actually happen to that individual. The conclusion is rather that anything
that can happen to a particular type of individual will actually happen to
some token of that type. So, for example, we do not claim that everything
that can possibly happen to you will actually happen to you. The claim is
only that everything that can possibly happen to you will actually happen
to some qualitative duplicate of you.
Ultimately, our argument is more a scientific theory than a philosophical
account, and it has already been presented as such elsewhere (Garriga &
Vilenkin [2001]). Still, we feel that the theory has important implications
for issues that have traditionally been the concern of philosophers. This
paper, written jointly by two physicists and a philosopher, explores these
philosophical implications.
We proceed in two steps. First, we provide a condensed, non-technical
explanation of the argument. Then we explore the implications of this argu-
ment for questions about modality, ethics, and doomsday.
2 Physics Background
The assertions that the universe is infinite and that the number of possible
histories in a finite spacetime region is finite are crucial for our argument.
Here, we shall briefly discuss the physical origin of these claims and provide
some references where further details can be found.
2.1 The number of possible histories is finite
Suppose we pick a region of space and an interval of time. This defines a
region of spacetime. We want to consider histories that can occur in this
spacetime region. If we divide the space in such a region into small sub-
regions, we can define a history as a specification of the contents of each
subregion at successive moments of time.
Quantum mechanics assigns a probability to each of the histories, and
we say that a history is possible if its probability is not equal to zero. This
includes a very wide class of histories, since in quantum mechanics anything
that is not strictly forbidden has a nonzero probability. The only histories
that are excluded are the ones that violate some exact conservation laws, like
the conservation of energy or of electric charge.
It can be shown, however, that there are only finitely many distinct histo-
ries that can occur in any finite spacetime region. One might think that the
subregions and the intervals between moments of time could be made arbi-
trarily small, and the contents specified arbitrarily precisely, so the number
of possibilities should be infinite, and of course in classical mechanics that
would indeed be so. But in the quantum mechanical world the situation is
different.
In quantum mechanics, if two histories are too similar, there is the possi-
bility of interference between them. In that case, it is not meaningful to say
that the two histories are alternative possibilities. Instead, both possibilities
together contribute to the outcome.
The concept in quantum mechanics that corresponds to the ordinary
idea of alternative possibilities is that of decoherent histories (Gell-Mann
and Hartle, [1993]). If the subregions and their values are specified suffi-
ciently coarsely, the resulting histories will decohere, meaning that they do
not interfere with each other and can be meaningfully interpreted as classi-
cal alternatives. When we discuss the set of possible histories, we mean the
set of decoherent histories, which are mutually exclusive possibilities for the
evolution of a region. In order to have decoherence between the histories, the
subregions cannot be too small and their values cannot be too finely speci-
fied, and as a result the number of decoherent histories is finite. For more
details see Garriga and Vilenkin ([2001]).
Suppose, for example, that we have a box containing a radioactive atom,
which decays by emitting an alpha particle. We observe the box over a finite
time T. Histories of the box can be defined by dividing it into little cells and
subdividing T into small intervals. If the decay occurs during the time T,
then at some point an alpha-particle will appear in one of the cells, and then
move on to other cells, as it propagates away from the atom. A possible
history is given by specifying the cells containing the atom and the alpha-
particle at each time interval. To assure decoherence, the cell sizes need to
be chosen greater than the de Broglie wavelength of the alpha-particle; there
is a similar lower bound on the time interval.
2.2 The universe is infinite
The claim that the universe is infinite is a consequence of the theory of
inflation. This theory began as a speculative hypothesis when it was proposed
by Alan Guth ([1981]), but it is now well on its way to becoming one of
the cornerstones of modern cosmology. The central role in the theory is
played by a peculiar form of matter—known as ‘false vacuum’—which is
characterized by high energy and strong repulsive gravitational field. Here,
the word ‘false’ alludes to the fact that this type of vacuum is unstable
and decays into ordinary (true) vacuum. Inflation is an epoch of super-fast,
accelerated cosmic expansion, driven by the repulsive gravity of false vacuum.
Decay of the false vacuum marks the end of inflation and plays the role of
the big bang in this theory.
One of the striking aspects of inflation is that, generically, it never ends
in the entire universe. False vacuum decay is a probabilistic process; it does
not occur everywhere simultaneously. In practically all models of inflation,
false vacuum regions grow due to expansion faster than they decay. This
means that the total volume of such regions in the universe keeps growing
without bound. Thus, inflation is a runaway process, which stopped in our
region, but still continues in other parts of the universe (Vilenkin [1983];
Linde [1986]; for a recent review, see Guth [2000]).
Post-inflationary regions like ours form ‘island universes’ in the inflating
sea. As seen by an observer in the false vacuum region, the false vacuum
is always decaying and so each island universe becomes larger and larger.
Different parts of the universe spend different amounts of time in the inflating
state.
However, from the point of view of an observer like us in an island uni-
verse, the Big Bang is the time at which inflation ended, and our notion
of time is the time since then. Our island universe is infinite, in the sense
that the volume of space where the time since the big bang is the same as
that time here goes on forever and so is infinitely large. One cannot travel
from an island universe to the inflating sea, because that would require going
backward in time, nor can one travel to another island universe.
The eternally inflating spacetime contains an infinite number of island
universes. However, since each island universe is itself spatially infinite, it is
sufficient for our purposes to consider a single island universe.
Remarkably, the entire universe, which contains all these infinite island
universes, may be finite. The apparent contradiction is resolved due to the
fact that the internal notion of time in island universes is different from the
‘global’ time that one has to use to describe the entire spacetime. The volume
of the universe at a particular global time may be finite, but the volume in
an island universe at the time of the Big Bang in that universe (or any later
time) is infinite.
When we discuss the history of a region of our island universe we include
only the history since the Big Bang, i.e., since inflation ended. We do not
include the time that the region spent in the false vacuum. That time has
no effect on later events, since the state of a region at the end of inflation
has no dependence on the amount of time it spent inflating.
2.3 Every possible history occurs an infinite number
of times
Since the universe is spatially infinite, it can be subdivided into an infinite
number of regions of any given size. Thus we have an infinite number of
regions and only a finite number of histories that can unfold in them. Since
the regions develop independently, every possible history has a nonzero prob-
ability and will therefore, with probability 1, occur in an infinite number of
regions. (It is of course possible for an infinite universe to contain only a
finite number of regions with a certain history, but the probability of that
situation is strictly zero, so we will not consider it.)
Prior to Garriga and Vilenkin ([2001]), a similar argument was given by
Ellis and Brundrit ([1979]), who discussed the implications of the assump-
tions that the universe is infinite and approximately homogeneous. They
argued that there should be some regions in such a universe with histories
very similar to that in our region. Our discussion here goes beyond that of
Ellis and Brundrit in two respects: (i) the spatial infinity of the universe in
our picture is a consequence of the theory of inflation and does not have to
be independently postulated, and (ii) we argued that the number of distinct
histories is finite, which allowed us to conclude that there should be regions
with histories not only similar, but identical to ours (in the sense that those
regions contain qualitative duplicates of every object in our region).
3 Frequency and Probability
The theory of inflation has surprising consequences for our intuitive under-
standing of frequency. On this intuitive understanding, it seems that one
should be able to obtain exact frequencies by counting up the total quanti-
ties of certain objects and then doing some simple arithmetic. Thus, suppose
that we are wondering about the frequency with which planets in the universe
contain life. Intuitively, it may appear that the exact answer to our question
could be obtained by counting up all the planets in the universe that contain
life and then dividing by the total number of planets in the universe.
The theory of inflation shows that this approach is unworkable. Since the
universe contains infinitely many planets and infinitely many planets that
contain life, no sense can be attached to the notion of a quotient obtained
by dividing the number of planets that contain life by the total number of
planets. Still, there is a certain sense in which we can speak of the ‘frequency’
with which planets contain life. We start out by taking a finite spherical
region of space. Then we can look at the ratio of the number of planets
containing life to the total number of planets in that one finite region. As
we increase the radius of the sphere, this ratio will converge, and the limit
will not depend of the choice of the center of the sphere. The frequency with
which planets in our universe contain life can then be identified with this
limit.
Using this revised definition of frequency, it can be shown that the fre-
quency of an event is simply equal to its quantum-mechanical probability.
In other words, if quantum mechanics tells us that some given type of event
occurs with probability x, we can infer that that type of event also occurs
with frequency x. The quantum-mechanical probability can be defined in
terms of an ensemble of qualitatively identical systems in the same initial
state. The probability that a measurement of some observable will give a
certain result is then simply the fraction of systems in the ensemble where
that result is obtained. With eternal inflation, there is no need to introduce
an imaginary ensemble: for any system, an infinite ensemble of qualitatively
identical systems exists in each island universe.
We can now introduce the aspect of the theory from which the chief philo-
sophical implications will be derived. Although there is an extremely small
probability that any given region will contain a planet exactly like our own—
with exactly the same sorts of organisms, exactly the same configurations of
land and ocean, and so forth—the theory of inflation nonetheless permits us
to assign a probability of 1 to the proposition that there are infinitely many
such planets in the universe. Moreover, the theory allows us to conclude that
the universe contains infinitely many planets that diverge from ours in spe-
cific ways, with the frequency of each type of diverging planet corresponding
exactly to its probability.
Thus, consider our planet as it was 300 million years ago. Given the
exact state of our planet at that time, it would be possible (at least in princi-
ple) to assign quantum-mechanical probabilities to various outcomes. There
was a certain probability that the planet would eventually come to contain
mammals, a far smaller probability that the planet would eventually come
to contain human beings, and so forth. In fact, there was a certain probabil-
ity that the earth would eventually come to contain a human being exactly
like you, in surroundings exactly like the ones you now inhabit, reading a
philosophy paper exactly like the one you are reading right now. This last
probability is extremely small—so small that we could normally afford to
ignore it. But although the probability is extremely small, it is surely above
zero.
The theory of inflation now allows us to conclude that, 300 million years
ago, the universe contained infinitely many planets exactly like our own.
These various planets then underwent various different histories, with the
frequency of each history coming out precisely equal to its probability. A
certain portion contain mammals, a smaller portion contain humans, and a
still smaller portion—almost unfathomably small, but still nonzero—contain
a person exactly like you.
Our own planet can therefore be seen as one element in an infinite en-
semble of planets. Indeed, our planet can be seen as an element in a number
of different infinite ensembles—the ensemble of all planets in the universe,
the ensemble of all planets that contain intelligent life, the ensemble of all
planets that are exactly like our own in every respect, and so on. In the
later sections of the present paper, we argue that a number of important
philosophical implications can be derived when we regard our civilization as
an element of one or another of these ensembles.
4 Inflation Contrasted
We pause here to compare our theory with three philosophical views that
may appear (at least on some superficial level) to resemble it.
Throughout this section, our chief aim is to differentiate the theory of
inflation from certain philosophical views with which it might be confused.
At no point will we be arguing that the theory of inflation somehow provides
evidence in favor of these views. Nor will we claim that it functions as a
competing theory, such that if the theory of inflation is true, these other views
must be false. Rather, we claim that the philosophical views are directed
primarily at questions other than the one that the theory of inflation is
designed to answer. (Two of the philosophical views are concerned primarily
with metaphysical questions; the third is concerned primarily with ethical
questions.) By contrasting the theory of inflation with these philosophical
ideas, we hope to clarify and further explain certain aspects of the theory
itself.
4.1 Modal realism
First, we should acknowledge that the theory of modal realism, as formulated
by David Lewis ([1986]), appears to yield the very same conclusion that
we have been defending thus far. Lewis is clearly committed to the view
that there are infinitely many regions of any given size. Moreover, Lewis
is committed to the view that every possible history is realized in at least
one region. Indeed modal realism seems to yield a far stronger conclusion
than our own, since Lewis argues that all metaphysically possible histories
are realized, even those that are not physically possible. It may therefore
appear that the theory of inflation is just a more complicated way of arriving
at conclusions that fall naturally out of Lewis’s modal realism.
But this appearance is misleading. Although the theory of inflation and
modal realism seem to be making similar claims, they are in fact concerned
with quite different subject matters, and they should therefore be regarded
as entirely independent. Modal realism is the thesis that all possible worlds
truly exist. Thus, the modal realist claims that we happen to be living in
one world (the actual world) but that there are also other possible worlds
and these other worlds are no less real than our own. By contrast, the theory
of inflation is a thesis about the actual world. The theory makes no claims
about ‘other worlds’ or ‘parallel universes.’ All of the regions posited by the
theory are located in the very same spacetime that we now inhabit. Thus,
when we say that one can assign a probability of 1 to the proposition that
every possible history is realized in infinitely many regions, we are making a
straightforward physical claim about regions of our universe.1 Most of these
regions are extremely far away, but they are connected to us by ordinary
spatio-temporal relations, and they all share a common causal origin.
For this reason, the theory of eternal inflation is immune to an objection
that has sometimes been leveled against modal realism. The objection runs
something like this: ‘Since events in our own world are supposed to have no
causal connection to events in other worlds, it seems that we can never really
learn anything about any world other than our own. Any claim made about
other possible worlds must be pure speculation, unsupported by the usual
procedures of scientific inquiry.’
We do not wish to take a position either way about whether or not this is a
valid objection to modal realism, but we do want to emphasize that the theory
1Thus, the theory of inflation should also be distinguished from many-world interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics (Deutsch [1998]; DeWitt [1970]; Everett [1957]). According to
this interpretation, the wave function of the universe describes a multitude of disconnected
universes with all possible histories—a picture reminiscent of the one that follows from the
theory of inflation. However, the reality of the other universes in the many-world theory is
still a matter of controversy (see, e.g., Brown & Davies [1993]), whereas the ensemble of re-
gions that we discuss in this paper is unquestionably real. (We emphasize that the picture
of the universe presented here is independent of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
If the many-worlds interpretation is adopted, then there is an ensemble of disconnected,
eternally inflating universes, each having an infinite number of regions, where all possible
histories unfold. Our picture should apply to each of the universes in the ensemble.)
of inflation is not vulnerable to a parallel objection. The theory of inflation
is a scientific theory, and it can therefore be supported by observational
evidence. Of course, someone might argue as follows: ‘All events outside the
observable region are, by definition, unobservable. Therefore, we cannot gain
any knowledge about events outside the observable region, and we can never
know whether or not every possible history is realized in at least one region.’
But this argument is without force. First of all, it isn’t necessarily true
that we will never be able to observe events outside the observable region.
Although we are not now able to observe such events, we may be able to
observe them at some future time. (Indeed, we may even be able to travel
to parts of the universe that fall outside the presently observable region.2)
More importantly, however, it seems clear that we can gain evidence about
events in remote regions of the universe without ever actually observing those
events. Drawing on evidence from the observable region, we can construct
and test physical theories. These theories will then generate predictions
about events outside the observable region, and insofar as we have reason to
believe the theories, we have reason to believe the predictions they generate.
In other words, even if we are never able to make observations concerning
events outside the presently observable region, our knowledge of the presently
observable region may permit us to make justifiable inferences concerning
events in other parts of the universe.
4.2 Actualism
Consider now the strong form of determinism according to which nothing
can possibly happen other than what actually does happen. A proponent of
such a theory would say, e.g., that if we have actually decided to write this
paper, we could not possibly have decided not to write the paper, indeed
that our lives could not have been even slightly different from the way they
actually are. Following Ayers ([1968]), we refer to this view as actualism.3
It may appear that the actualist arrives ultimately at the very same con-
2Travel to remote regions may or may not be possible, depending on the nature of the
dark energy causing the accelerated expansion of the universe. If the dark energy density
is constant, we will not be able to travel beyond the presently observable universe. But if
the dark energy vanishes over time, then there is no limit on how far we can travel.
3In more recent work, the word ‘actualism’ is normally used to refer to the view that
only the actual world truly exists (e.g., Adams [1981]). Note that we are here using the
word in an older sense, such that it refers to the view that only actual events are possible.
clusion that we have been defending thus far. After all, it seems that ac-
tualism and the theory of inflation are simply two different routes to the
conclusion that everything possible is actual—with the only major difference
being that actualism claims that surprisingly few things are possible whereas
the theory of inflation claims that surprisingly many things are actual.
But here again, appearances are deceiving. The slogan ‘Everything pos-
sible is actual’ conceals an important ambiguity, and although this slogan
could be appropriated with equal justice by either actualism or the theory of
inflation, it would have very different meanings in these two different theo-
retical contexts.
The actualist asserts that there is only one possible history in any given
region. By contrast, the theory of inflation does not challenge the assumption
that, in any given region, there are a variety of distinct possible histories.
Rather, what the theory asserts is that (with probability 1) all of these pos-
sible histories will be realized in some region of the universe. Thus, although
only one of the possible histories will be actual in the region that we now
inhabit, all possible histories will be actual somewhere.
In a certain sense, then, the theory of inflation is the opposite of actualism.
Daniel Dennett has said that we need to ‘stave off actualism’ with ‘elbow
room’ that ‘prevents the possible from shrinking tightly around the actual’
(Dennett [1984], p. 145, 162) The theory of inflation instead posits an infinite
amount of space that permits the actual to grow to fit the possible.
4.3 Eternal recurrence
We turn now to a third philosophical idea that seems to resemble the the-
ory of eternal inflation: Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence. The
doctrine is notoriously difficult to interpret, as Nietzsche’s published works
don’t include any passages in which he presents it in his own words. All
interpretations must therefore be based entirely on Nietzsche’s unpublished
notes and on passages from the published works in which Nietzsche presents
his views through fictional stories.
In these passages, Nietzsche’s fictional personae claim that everything
that has happened in our lives will happen infinitely many times in the future
(e.g., Z III §2; GS§341). Nietzsche scholars disagree about how such passages
should be interpreted. Some claim that Nietzsche is literally advancing a
claim about the nature of the universe: namely, that every event that we
now observe will recur an infinite number of times (Danto [1965]). Others say
that the doctrine of eternal recurrence should be understood not as a literal
claim about the nature of the universe but rather as a metaphor that we can
use to think about our lives. On this latter view, the idea is that we ought
to live our lives as though everything we did were going to recur an infinite
number of times (Nehamas [1985]). Either way, it is clear that Nietzsche
meant his doctrine of the eternal recurrence to have profound implications
for our ordinary decisions.
Here it might be helpful to consider a more concrete example. Consider a
novelist who is wondering whether to continue working on his book or just to
relax for a moment and watch a sit-com on television. And now suppose the
novelist comes to believe that, whichever action he chooses to perform, that
action will end up being performed an infinite number of times. It seems
that the novelist’s decision would then acquire an enormous significance,
what Nietzsche calls ‘the greatest weight’ (GS §341).
Although the theory of inflation seems at least somewhat similar to the
doctrine of eternal recurrence, it would be wrong to suppose that the theory
of inflation has the same implications for human life. Like the doctrine of
eternal recurrence, the theory of inflation says that every action you choose
to perform will be performed an infinite number of times. But unlike the
doctrine of eternal recurrence, the theory of inflation also says that every
possible action you choose not to perform will be performed an infinite num-
ber of times. To get a sense for the force of this claim, consider again the
novelist facing a decision about how to spend his evening, this time assum-
ing that he has come to accept the theory of inflation. The novelist will
then conclude that there are infinitely many people exactly like him and
that each member of this infinite ensemble faces a choice between working
and watching television. However, he will not feel that these other people
stand to him in any relation of causal dependence.4 Nor will he believe that
their choices must necessarily be identical to his own. On the contrary, he
4Here our novelist appears to be faced with a complex problem in decision theory. If he
chooses to work on his novel, he will be maximizing the expected frequency with which his
counterparts throughout the universe chose to work on their respective novels. (After all,
it is highly probable that the majority of his counterparts will end up choosing the same
option that he himself chooses.) But since he cannot actually have any causal impact on
these counterparts, we will assume that it would be a mistake for him to try to maximize
the expected frequency with which they perform a particular action. In other words, we
will presuppose that he ought to act in accordance with some version of causal decision
theory.
will reach precisely the opposite conclusion: that no matter which option he
chooses to select, an infinite number of people exactly like him will end up
selecting some other option. Thus, he will conclude that, even if he chooses
to relax and watch television, an infinite number of people exactly like him
will choose to keep working on the novel.
5 Ethical Implications
Since the theory of inflation leads in this way to the opposite conclusion
from the doctrine of eternal recurrence, one might think that the theory of
inflation should have the opposite effect on the way people think about their
lives. Just as the doctrine of eternal recurrence makes every decision seem
extremely weighty or important, one might think that the theory of inflation
makes every decision seem insignificant or inconsequential. A defender of
such a view could say: ‘We already know (with probability 1) that infinitely
many good events will occur and that infinitely many bad events will occur.
We know, for example, that infinitely many people exactly like our novelist
will finish their work and that infinitely many will leave their work unfinished.
Nothing that anyone does can ever change this. So why should it be a matter
of any real concern whether some given person happens to choose one option
or the other?’
To evaluate this argument, we need to distinguish among a number of
different ways in which a person might have a deep concern with her own
decisions. We can then ask, for each of these types of concern, what impact
the theory of inflation ought to have.
First, let us consider irreducibly de se concerns—i.e., concerns that relate
in some essential way to one’s own self (Castan˜eda [1966]; Lewis [1979]). To
take a simple example, imagine a person who wants to go jogging. Presum-
ably, her aim is not that all people of some general type go jogging. Rather,
her aim is that she herself go jogging. To the extent that a person’s concerns
have this de se character, they should be relatively unaffected by knowledge
of the theory of inflation. After all, suppose the person knows full well that
there are infinitely many people exactly like her, and suppose she knows
that, no matter what she does, infinitely many of these people will go jog-
ging and infinitely many will not go jogging. This knowledge may have little
or no bearing on her real concern. Her concern is not with what happens
to all of those other people but with what happens to her. She is concerned
about whether or not she ends up going jogging, and the fact that there are
infinitely many people exactly like her seems not to affect the issue in any
way.
Similar remarks apply to those who are concerned with particular objects,
events or people. Take the father who feels a special concern for his own
daughter. Even if he discovers that remote regions of the universe contain
other people who resemble his daughter in every possible respect, he might
find that he cares far more about his own daughter than he does about any
of these other people (Frankfurt [1999]). Suppose, e.g., that such a man sees
his daughter crying and runs to comfort her. If he accepts the theory of
inflation, he can conclude that the universe contains an infinite number of
events exactly like the one he is now witnessing—an infinite number of girls
exactly like his daughter, all feeling upset in exactly the same way for exactly
the same reason. However, this conclusion will not lead him to regard his
own action as any less consequential. He will not feel frustrated to learn that
he is helping only one member of an infinite population. Rather, he will feel
that his own daughter has some special importance—an importance that no
other person can share—and that he is therefore accomplishing something
important by making sure that she receives adequate comfort.
But now suppose we turn to a person who is concerned with the total
quantity of something in the world. Such a person might donate money to the
Audubon Society in the hope of increasing the total quantity of goldfinches.
Or, in a more philosophical moment, the person might think that moral-
ity is a matter of increasing the total quantity of happiness in the universe.
Here there really does seem to be a problem. If there are infinitely many
goldfinches in the world, it seems that one cannot increase their total quan-
tity by donating to the Audubon Society. Similarly, if there is already an
infinite quantity of happiness, one cannot increase that quantity by engaging
in altruistic activities. (Of course, one can engage in activities that cause
some people to be happier and don’t cause any people to be less happy—
but this result is not correctly described as involving a net increase in any
total quantity.) To determine whether or not this sort of concern should be
affected by knowledge of inflation, one has to ask oneself whether it is truly
the total quantity that matters. Is it necessary that one actually increase
the total quantity of happiness? Or would it be sufficient merely to perform
an action that added some happiness to the world without subtracting any
away? Or would it perhaps be sufficient to increase the total quantity of
happiness around here without having any effect at all on the total quantity
in the world as a whole?
Note that the problems that arise here are very different from those facing
the modal realist. The modal realist cannot coherently say that we ought
to try, through our actions, to make reality as a whole better than it would
otherwise have been. Of course, the modal realist can still use sentences like:
‘Things would be better if you gave that money to the Audubon Society
than if you gave it to the Nazi Party.’ But such a sentence means only that
the possible world in which you give to the Audubon Society is better than
the one in which you give to the Nazi Party. No real sense can be attached
to the notion that reality as a whole—including all of the possible worlds—
would be better if you did one thing rather than another. Faced with this
difficulty, Lewis ([1986] p. 128) suggests that we give up on the whole idea of
a universalistic ethics. Instead, he argues that we ought to show a particular
concern for the people who occupy our own world.
Eternal inflation is not nearly so radical in its implications. A believer
in eternal inflation can still hold on to the view that the universe would be
better if you did one thing rather than another. It’s just that this notion of
the universe’s being ‘better’ cannot be understood in terms of maximizing
the total quantity of happiness. To the extent that one wants to hold on to
the underlying spirit of utilitarianism, one will have to make certain techni-
cal modifications in its ‘total happiness principle.’ Such modifications have
been proposed by Vallentyne and Kagan ([1997]) among others (see Bostrom
[2004]) . We will not be getting into the details here, but one key implica-
tion is that an agent is doing the right thing if he or she increases the total
quantity of happiness of the people in some finite set and has no effect on
anyone else.
Finally, let us consider cases in which a person is specifically concerned
with uniqueness. An art collector may value a particular painting on the
grounds that, in the whole world, there has never been anything quite like it.
A scientist may derive a special kind of pride from thoughts like ‘I am the only
person ever to have developed this key insight.’ An environmentalist may
ascribe a special importance to a specific herd of animals on the grounds
that they are the only remaining specimens of their species. Here again,
the theory of inflation may indicate that something has gone wrong. When
claims of uniqueness are taken in the most literal sense, the theory of inflation
can show that they are false. Thus, the art collector is wrong to think that
there are literally no paintings in the entire world exactly like the one she
now possesses. The truth is that there are infinitely many paintings exactly
like hers; it’s just that they are so far away that she will never be able to
observe them. The important question, then, is whether it really matters
that a particular object or event be literally unique. Does it really matter,
for example, that the painting be literally the only one of its kind in the
entire universe? Or is it sufficient that the painting be the only one of its
kind within a 10100 parsec radius?
This sort of question becomes especially pressing when applied to the
concern we feel about the continuing existence of our own civilization. The
theory of inflation tells us that the universe contains an infinite number of
civilizations exactly like ours. Thus, even if our own civilization is entirely de-
stroyed over the course of the next century, the theory tells us that an infinite
number of other civilizations exactly like ours will continue to exist. Does the
theory therefore give us a reason to feel less concerned about nuclear wars,
asteroid collisions and other events that might destroy our civilization? Here
again, the answer will depend on why exactly we were concerned about the
possibility of this destruction in the first place. If we were concerned because
we valued particular people or particular institutions that now inhabit the
earth, then the theory should have no effect on our feelings. But if we were
concerned because we felt that our civilization was somehow unique—so that
if our civilization were destroyed, the universe would no longer contain any-
thing even remotely like the presently-existing human race—then the theory
tells us that our concern was based on a false assumption.
Presumably, the concern that we actually feel is based on a complex
combination of different beliefs, desires and emotions. Some of these should
be affected by the theory of inflation; others should not. It therefore remains
to be seen whether the theory should have any substantial impact on our
overall attitude toward the continuing existence of our civilization.
6 Universal Doomsday
As discussed above, the theory of inflation implies that we are part of an
infinitely large ‘island universe’ that contains an infinite number of civiliza-
tions. According to the anthropic principle (codified, for example, as the
‘self-sampling assumption’; Bostrom [2002]) we should reason as if we were
randomly selected from all the individuals in all those civilizations. Thus
our expectation of finding ourselves in any particular circumstances is pro-
portional to the number of observers in those circumstances. We now want
to ask whether it is possible to use information about our own circumstances
to make inferences about the average lifetimes of civilizations in our universe.
First, it is clear that there is some nonzero probability for a civilization
to survive early threats to its existence (nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.).
Such a civilization might go on to spread across its galaxy. It could endure
for millions of years and contain a huge number of individuals. We will refer
to such civilizations as long-lived. On the other hand, some civilizations
will succumb to existential threats and so be short-lived. What will be the
fraction of each?
Unless the fraction of long-lived civilizations is tiny, nearly all individuals
will belong to them, and furthermore will live late in their civilizations when
most of the individuals live. That, however, is not the circumstance in which
we find ourselves. Instead, we find that we live either in a short-lived civi-
lization or very early in a long-lived one. While we do not have a clear idea
of how long to expect civilizations to last, when we take into account our
circumstances, we should clearly update our ideas in favor of a much larger
chance for civilizations to be short-lived (Carter unpublished; Leslie [1996]
p. 231; see also Olum [2004]).
Let f(S) be the frequency (as defined in §3) with which civilizations are
short-lived, and f(L) = 1 − f(S) the frequency with which civilizations are
long-lived. We don’t know these frequencies, so let fprior denote our best un-
derstanding of the frequencies before we take into account our circumstances.
Now suppose you learn that you have birth rank N , i.e., you are the Nth
human to be born. You should update your frequencies via Bayes’s Rule, to
get
fN(S) =
P (N |S)fprior(S)
P (N |S)fprior(S) + P (N |L)fprior(L)
, (1)
where P (N |a) is the chance that you would have birth rank N given that
we are in a long- or short-lived civilization, and a is L or S accordingly. You
could be any individual in the civilization, so
P (N |a) =
{
1/Na N ≤ Na
0 N > Na
, (2)
where Na is the number of individuals in each civilization. Since NL ≫ NS,
P (N |L)≪ P (N |S), and thus fN(S) is nearly 1 unless fprior(S) is extremely
small. Unless we previously thought that long-lived civilizations were much
more likely, we should now think that almost all civilizations will be short-
lived—a sort of ‘universal doomsday’.
The ‘universal doomsday’ argument that we advance here should be care-
fully distinguished from the classic doomsday argument (Carter unpublished;
Gott [1993]; Leslie [1989], [1996]; Nielsen [1989]). The classic doomsday ar-
gument was an attempt to show that our present circumstances give us some
reason to believe that our own particular civilization will soon come to an
end. The argument advanced here is quite different. We make no specific
claims regarding the longevity of any particular civilization. Rather, we say
that our present circumstances give us reason to reach a general conclusion
about our universe: namely, that long-lived civilizations are extremely infre-
quent in our universe as a whole.
Moreover, as we now proceed to argue, the theory of inflation gives us
reason to reject the particular doomsday argument, accepting only the uni-
versal doomsday argument. Thus, the doomsday argument has nothing to
say specifically about our own civilization as distinct from others. Instead
it tells us about the general longevity of civilizations sufficiently similar to
ours to be included in the same reference class—although, of course, what
we learn about civilizations in general, we should also apply to ourselves.
6.1 Application to our civilization in particular
Traditionally, the doomsday argument has been applied to the future of our
own particular civilization. We let Pprior(a), with a = S or L, be our subjec-
tive probabilities that our own civilization will be short-lived or long-lived,
before we take into account our birth rank. We then update our probabilities
as
P (S|N) =
P (N |S)Pprior(S)
P (N |S)Pprior(S) + P (N |L)Pprior(L)
(3)
Thus unless Pprior(S) is infinitesimal, we will find that P (S|N) is nearly 1,
just as above.
That analysis, however, neglects the possibility that we could have been
in any other civilization. There is some controversy about which individuals
should be included in the reference class among which we should expect to
be typical, but it should be clear that we must at least include all observers
subjectively indistinguishable from ourselves (Bostrom [2002]). However, the
theory of inflation implies that there are infinitely many such observers, be-
longing to civilizations with every possible lifespan.
Now we should reason as though we were chosen randomly among humans
in the various human civilizations in our universe, where again the random
choice is to be understood as the limit of random choices in successively
larger finite regions, as in §3. Then, before we make the probability shift
above, we should realize that the chance that our civilization is large is not
just the frequency of civilizations that are large, but must be corrected for
the increased chance to be in a long-lived civilization because it has more
individuals. Taking that into account, we find that the probability for our
civilization to be small, before taking into account birth rank, is
Pprior(S) =
NSf(S)
NSf(S) +NLf(L)
(4)
and similarly for Pprior(L). To take our birth rank into account, we use (4)
in (3) to get
P (S|N) = f(S) . (5)
This effect exactly cancels out the impact of the particular doomsday
argument, leaving us with the conclusion that our chances that we are now in
a long-lived or a short-lived civilization are just proportional to the prevalence
of such civilizations (Bostrom [2002]; Dieks [1992]; Olum [2002]). Thus, if
the theory of inflation is correct, the doomsday argument has nothing to say
about the longevity of our specific civilization, but only about the general
longevity of civilizations sufficiently similar to ours to be included in the
same reference class.
At this point, one might object that similar considerations could be used
to defeat the universal doomsday argument. Thus, one might suggest that
we are typical not merely among all those individuals in our universe, but
rather among all those individuals who might exist according to alternative
theories of the universe, if we don’t know which theory is correct. If the
universe developed in some probabilistic way before the beginning of infla-
tion, so that early chance events affected all regions together, then one can
consider also the possible observers who might exist as a result of all differ-
ent early developments. Including all such possible observers in the reference
class is equivalent to accepting the self-indication assumption (SIA) (Bostrom
[2002]), first introduced by Dieks ([1992]), which states that the chance that
you would exist at all is greater in a universe which contains more observers.
If one accepts SIA, then a universe with long-lived civilizations is more likely
because of the greater number of individuals that it contains, and that ef-
fect cancels all forms of doomsday argument. SIA is controversial, however,
most notably because of the ‘presumptuous philosopher’ example (Bostrom
[2002]). We will not address that controversy here5, but for the purposes of
the present paper will consider the situation where one does not include SIA.
6.2 Universal vs. particular dooms
Some effects which might shorten the life expectancy of our civilization apply
only to ours specifically, while others shorten the general life expectancy of
all civilizations. For example, suppose that we are concerned with the earth
being hit by an asteroid. The chance of such a collision, in the next century
say, is a function of the number of asteroids in the solar system and the
chance that any given asteroid is on a course which will hit the earth during
that period.
Now a specific asteroid which happens to be on a collision course with us
is a ‘particular doom’ that affects only us. The fact that the asteroid has, by
chance, the doomsday orbit says nothing about other asteroids in other solar
systems like ours. The particular orbit of the asteroid is unrelated to the
distribution of civilizations that will or will not be destroyed by asteroids.
Given the theory of inflation, there is thus no reason to believe that such
orbits are more likely than one would first think.
On the other hand, the total number of asteroids could well be determined
by some universal process of solar system formation and most solar systems
like ours would have similar numbers of asteroids. Therefore if the (incom-
pletely known) process that produces asteroid belts turns out to produce an
especially large number of asteroids, the lifetimes of all civilizations would
be on average shortened. Large numbers of asteroids are a ‘universal doom’
that (statistically) affects all civilizations, and thus the doomsday argument
makes them more likely.
6.3 Practical applications
The doomsday argument has practical applications. If you care about the
future of the human race you might want to reduce the probability of possible
causes of extinction that you might have some control over. The degree to
which you should be concerned with such possible causes depends on how
likely they are, and if you accept the doomsday argument you should think
the possible dooms more likely than you would otherwise have thought.
5For recent discussions of arguments for and against SIA, see Olum ([2002]) and
Bostrom and Cirkovic ([2003]).
The argument presented here should change your calculation. You should
not think a process is more likely if it affects us alone, but you should think it
more likely if it affects civilizations everywhere in the universe. To continue
the above example, you should be more concerned that a large number of
asteroids have not yet been detected than about the particular orbit of each
one. You should not worry especially about the chance that some specific
nearby star will become a supernova, but more about the chance that super-
novas are more deadly to nearby life than we believe. Many other examples
are possible.
7 Concluding Remarks
Since at least the time of Copernicus, physicists have been casting doubt
on the na¨ıve view that our planet plays some unique and special role in
the universe. First it became clear that our planet was not the center of
the cosmos—that the planet Earth was just one of the planets in our solar
system. Then we gradually accumulated evidence for the view that our solar
system was itself just one of the many such systems in the universe. These
theoretical advances contributed to a growing sense that our civilization plays
no special role in the cosmic drama, that it is just one tiny speck in a vast
universe. Thus, a series of scientific discoveries led to a series of philosophical
problems—problems about the significance of human life, about our role in
the divine plan, and so forth.
But although scientific discoveries have done a great deal to threaten our
na¨ıve worldview, they did appear to leave us with one way of holding on to
our intuitive sense that there was something special and unique about the
planet earth. We knew that our planet was just one of the many planets in
the universe, but we could nonetheless hold on to the idea that it was the only
planet that had certain distinctive properties—probably the only planet with
anything remotely like a human being, certainly the only one with all the art
forms, cultural traditions and political institutions that we most associate
with life on earth. The theory of inflation now shows us that even this last
claim to uniqueness was, in fact, illusory. Even we ourselves are not unique;
in that sense, as Alan Guth has said, the theory shows that we do not even
have ‘a unique copyright on our own identities’ (Quoted in Martin [2001]).
This new theoretical advance casts up a set of new philosophical questions;
we have tried to begin the exploration of those questions here.
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